
The 6th Doshisha - Chung-Ang University Joint Seminar on East Asian Social Welfare

**Changes and Relationships of Public and Private Transfers
to the elderly in Korea : An Empirical Study**

**Joo, Soo-Jeong
Department of Social Welfare, Social Policy
The Graduate School
Chung-Ang University
2016. 11. 19**

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1 Introduction

environment

- Demographic change: Low fertility rate and increase of aging population.
- Family structure change: Increase of nuclear families and one-person households. The rates of co-residence with their ascendants: 75.3% in 1990 → 28.4% in 2014
- As a result, the role of the family for the old-age income maintenance has changed.

Institution


- The old-age income security is maturing.
- Payment started in 2000 from National Basic Social Security, and the National Pension System from 2008.
- In 2008, Basic Old-Aged Pension has been introduced.
- In July, 2014 Basic Old-Aged Pension has been reformed into Basic Pension.

phenomena

- The role of the state for the old-age income maintenance is increasing.
- It can be inferred that public transfers to the elderly are increasing.
- **How about Private transfers to the elderly?**
Private transfers = Inter-household transfer + **Intra-household transfers**
- **Did public transfers crowd out private transfers to the elderly in Korea?**

1 Introduction

crowding-out effect?




Previous studies about crowding-out effect

- No clear evidence. Findings are inconsistent.
- Ignored intra-household transfers.
- Performed the cross-sectional analysis without employing a panel data.
- Failed to suggest specific political alternatives.

- Used to estimate effectiveness of the public redistribution programs.

1 Introduction: Private transfers to the elderly


Inter-household transfers



- **Inter-household transfers**

transfers between individuals living in different households.

Intra-household transfers



- **Intra-household transfers**

transfers between individuals living in the same household.

1 Introduction: Public transfers to the elderly

Different types of retirement-income provision in Korea

3 rd tier	Voluntary private pension, saving, private transfers		
2 nd tier	Corporate Pension (mandatory)	IRP	Specific Corporate Pension
	National Pension System		
1 st tier	Basic Old-age Pension		
	National Basic Social Security		
target	worker	employee/ Self-employment	etc.

* Taxonomy from OECD Pensions at a glance.

* Etc: soldier/civil servant/teacher

1 Introduction

Question 1

- At the macro level, what happened in public and private transfers to the elderly in Korea?
- How have private transfers changed when intra-household transfers are considered together with inter-household transfers?

Question 2

- At the individual level, did private transfers to the elderly decrease as public transfers of them increased?
- Is there the ‘Crowding-out’ effect of the private transfers by public transfers?

2 Theoretical Framework

Concept: Public and Private transfers to the elderly

- Components of the retirement income.
- Economic mechanisms used to reallocate resources across generation.

Theories: Motives for private transfers

- In Altruism model: the donor cares about the utility of the recipient.
- In Exchange model: People expect to get something back in return.

Existing works of the ‘Crowding out’ effect

- ‘Crowding out’ has implications for the efficacy of public transfer or redistributive programs and program evaluation.

Motives	Crowding-out effect	Effect of public transfers
Altruism	Altruism is strongly linked with the crowding out hypothesis	Government redistributive policies could be neutralized by the change in private transfers
Exchange	Unclear, Depend on each other’s marginal utility of consumption	Exchange motivated transfers could reinforce the effects of public transfers

3 -1. Research Questions

- How much private transfers flow from adult children to their parents considering intra-household transfers?
 - How have public and private transfers changed over time?
-
- Did public transfers crowd-out private transfers to the elderly in Korea?

3 -2. Data and Measure

- Data: Korea Welfare Panel Study(KoWePs) 3rd to 10th wave (2008 ~ 2014)
- The unit of analysis: the elderly households of which at least one of the household member is elder than 65.
- Divide the elderly household into 2 groups: To focus analysis on the group which was really affected by public transfers increasing.

Analysis Model	Before	Treatment	After	N(household)
Model 1	2007	Introduced Basic Old-age Pension (In 2008)	2010	2,330
Treatment group1	Not Received		Received	1,833
Comparison group1	Not Received		Not Received	497
Model 1	2013	Reformed Basic Old-age Pension (In 2014)	2014	3,506
Treatment group1	Not Received / Received		Received(Increased)	2,779
Comparison group1	Not Received /Received		Not Received /Received(maintained)	727

3 -2. Data and Measure


3 rd tier	Voluntary private pension, saving, private transfers		
2 nd tier	Corporate Pension (mandatory)	IRP	Specific Corporate Pension
	National Pension System – Defined Benefit		
1 st tier	Basic Old-age Pension From 2008, 70% of the elderly have newly received BP. From July 2014, Benefit level increased up to 200%.		
	National Basic Social Security		
target	worker	employee/ Self-employment	etc.

* Taxonomy from OECD Pensions at a glance


* Etc: Special Occupation(soldier/civil servant/teacher) Pension System

3 -3. Research Model


[Model 1] Changes in public and private transfers as Basic Pension introduced in 2008



[Model 2] Changes in public and private transfers as Basic Pension reformed in July, 2014




3 -4. Analysis Procedures



3 -5. Method: NTA to estimate intra-household transfers


Ex) three generation co-residence



- Deficit
Disposable income less than current private consumption.
- Surplus
Disposable income greater than current private consumption.
- Intra-household transfers
Household members with a deficit receive transfers from household members with a surplus.
- How to estimate Intra-household transfers
 - 1) Estimate private consumption from household consumption by using regression analysis.
 - 2) Constitute individual disposable income.
 - 3) Estimate Intra-household transfers by comparing private consumption and individual disposable income

3 -5. Method: Difference in Differences

Ex) Same Person in a panel data



- Using a panel data.
- Longitudinal section analysis.
- It helps us to distinguish what institutional changes affect.
- By considering the previous two cases of policy reform on public pension system as a natural experiment.

3 -5. Method: Difference in Differences

Model1	t ₁	Treatment	t ₂
Treated I	O ₁ (not received)	B.P introduced (in 2008)	O ₂ (received)
controlled I	O ₃ (not received)		O ₄ (not received)
Model2	t ₁	Treatment	t ₂
Treated II	O ₅ (received)	B.P reformed (in July, 2014)	O ₆ (increased)
controlled II	O ₇ (not received /received)		O ₈ (not received /maintained)

- Difference in differences analysis

$$y_i = \alpha + \delta D_i + \gamma T_i + \beta D_i T_i + e_i$$

- Difference in differences regression analysis

$$y_i = \alpha + \delta D_i + \gamma T_i + \beta D_i T_i + \sum_{j=1}^n \rho_j X_{ij} + e_i$$

3 -6. Variables

Dependent variables

- Private transfers
- Inter-household transfers
- Intra-household transfers

Explanatory variables


- Two cases of the policy reform
- In 2008, Introducing Basic Old-Aged Pension
- In July 2014, Reforming Basic Old-Aged Pension

Control variables

- Household income
- Age, the square of the age
- Marital status
- characters of household's head & household
- characters of institutions(recipient of public pensions, recipient of National Basic Social Security)
- Household net asset
- Gender


4 -1. Results:

Trends of private and public transfers to the elderly



4 -2. Results:

Trends of private and public transfers to the elderly as a proportion of equivalised disposable household income



4 -3. Results: simple DID

Changes of private transfers before and after B.P is introduced

Dependent	Groups	2007	2010	Difference(t)
Inter-household	treated	22.94	23.97	1.03(0.69)
	controlled	24.56	24.24	-0.32(-0.11)
	DID(t)	-1.62(-0.69)	-0.27(-0.13)	1.35(0.42)
Intra-household	treated	1.39	6.30	4.91**(2.27)
	controlled	-22.41	-10.19	12.22(1.6)
	DID(t)	23.81*** (4.11)	16.49*** (3.03)	-7.32(-0.92)
Total Private transfers	treated	24.33	30.26	5.93*** (2.72)
	controlled	2.14	14.04	11.90(1.52)
	DID(t)	22.19*** (3.71)	16.22*** (2.94)	-5.97(-0.73)

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Changes of private transfers before and after B.P is reformed

Dependent	Groups	2013	2014	Difference(t)
Inter-household	treated	22.89	21.23	-1.66*(-1.76)
	controlled	20.93	22.23	1.30(0.57)
	DID(t)	1.96(1.19)	-1.00(-0.54)	-2.96(-1.19)
Intra-household	treated	0.65	6.45	5.79(1.10)
	controlled	-27.90	-19.36	8.54(1.09)
	DID(t)	28.55*** (4.03)	25.80*** (4.11)	-2.75(-0.29)
Total Private transfers	treated	23.55	27.68	4.13(0.77)
	controlled	-6.97	2.88	9.84(1.22)
	DID(t)	30.51*** (4.19)	24.80*** (3.89)	-5.71(-0.59)

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

4 -4. Results: DID regression

Effects of increased public transfers as B.P is introduced (Model 1)

	Intra-household		Intra-household		Total-private transfers	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
treatment(2009)	-1.36	2.71	7.22	6.51	5.87	6.76
groups	1.62	2.49	14.39**	4.73	16.01**	4.96
interactions	1.17	2.96	-7.81	6.65	-6.64	6.95

Effects of increased public transfers as B.P is reformed (Model 2)

	Intra-household		Intra-household		Total-private transfers	
	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.	Coef.	S.E.
treatment(2013)	1.07	2.00	7.98	8.34	9.05	8.57
groups	5.34**	1.83	18.88*	7.70	24.22*	7.94
interactions	-3.36	2.13	-6.79	8.31	-10.15	8.56

5 Conclusion

Implications

- This study verified intra-household transfers which were not found in previous studies due to the limitation of the data and technical problems.
- It confirmed that the concerns about the efficacy of public transfers which could be dampened by the ‘crowding out’ effect have been exaggerated.
- This study suggests that there is a need of critical investigation of previous studies which argue that extensions of public transfers need to be controlled to improve policy efficiency.
- It can be inferred that public transfers to the elderly are insufficient because public transfers did not replace private transfers smoothly.

Limitations

- Technical problems remained in National Transfer Accounts.
- Sample selection bias and endogeneity problems remained because this study did not apply Propensity Score Matching in DID analysis.
- It dealt with treatment not as ordinal variables but just dummy variables in DID analysis.



Thank you for listening

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